FOR YOUR EYES ONLY

 

  

The entire Filipino nation is enraged with how their billions of tax money are stolen through the Priority Development Fund (PDF), or simply the “pork barrel fund”.
 

Perhaps only a few do know that government funds are also pilfered through other disbursements and loose accountability measures.  Or people do know, only that its enormity is not put to light because it is cloaked as classified information.

 

Among the most abused funds are the “Confidential and Intelligence Fund” and the twenty percent (20%) mandatory “Development Funds” of local government units (LGUs).

 

But what is the Confidential and Intelligence Fund? 
 

Intelligence funds are appropriated pursuant to Section 16, or the general welfare clause, of The Local Government Code, “in furtherance of the duties of local chief executives to maintain peace and order for the people’s comfort, convenience, and welfare, or for intelligence activities when the use of other funds is not applicable or would either expose or hinder the mission of the intelligence unit”.

 

It is termed “the favorite source of corruption in Local Government Units” because unlike other fund items in a budget,  Intelligence Funds are audited in a different manner that its accounting or liquidation is directed to the Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA), “FOR HIS EYES ONLY”, in a sealed envelope delivered through registered mail, courier, or hand-carried by an authorized liaison officer/s. 

 

The I.F.  report contains the liquidation vouchers, certified machine copies of the disbursement vouchers of the cash advance being liquidated, and a certification of the agency concerned that :

"We hereby certify that the amount of _____ (Php______) was incurred by the undersigned with PROJECT  ________ (File Code No.)

We further certify that the aforementioned Project is a highly confidential operation/ mission, the details of which cannot be divulged without posing a threat to national security.  We certify however that the details and supporting documents are in our custody and kept in our confidential file and may be audited if the circumstances so demand.”

So simple under the guise of confidentiality.  Now comes the money.

Cash advances from
the I.F. Fund

If this is strictly so, will the COA Chair have the luxury of time to scrutinize each and every liquidation report from at least 82 provinces, 135 cities, and 1,493 municipalities? 

 

Or will it be practical to verify each expense item in the vouchers? Why bother then even to open the sealed report, which may just probably contain nothing but bogus activities and signatures as no informant will give out a receipt or sign a Reimbursement Expense Receipt (RER) for purposes of liquidation?

 

To be fair, some COA Auditors had also the tenacity to criticize but given their limited prerogatives on the Confidential and Intelligence Expenses (CIE), reviews are restricted to the amount appropriated and its status of liquidation but not to its actual use or details of liquidation. 

Cash Advances

 

COA Auditors have reported that “the Provincial Government of Negros Oriental has released  P12.7 million in confidential and intelligence expenses (CIE) in 2011, more than P8.6 million of the amount allowed by law (Michael Punogbayan, COA Questions Excessive Negros Intel Funds, Philippine Star, updated March 12, 2013).”

 

COA Auditors also “questioned a P25- million cash advance, made in five checks of P5 million each, by the Cebu provincial government charged to its intelligence funds in April 2010 or a month before the May local and national elections. It noted procedural lapses since the fund was disbursed by the provincial treasurer instead of a high-ranking PNP officer.

 

More Cash Advances

‘The COA also noted that the cash advances were made without receipts, liquidation vouchers, and a report to the main COA office (Candeze R. Mongoya, 25-M ‘intelligence funds’ released a month before polls, Cebu Daily News, October 12, 2011).”

 

One can only speculate on whatever happened to these findings, or how other LGUs can get away with it.  If confidential information can be bought, then so with silence and tolerant eyes

But “The Sandiganbayan recently convicted former Dapitan City municipal mayor Joseph Cedrick Ruiz for graft and malversation charges for pocketing close to P1 million in confidential intelligence fund (CIF) from 1998 to 2001. Aside from imprisonment, the former mayor who was eventually appointed as judge of the Regional Trial Court in Makati was also slapped with perpetual special disqualification from holding any public office, fined P950,000 equivalent to the amount pocketed, and ordered to indemnify the city of Dapitan the sum of P950,000, plus interest.

 

More Cash Advance

‘Records showed that for the period from June 30, 1998, to June 30, 2001, Ruiz allowed Police Inspector Pepe E. Nortal to request, for and in his behalf, the withdrawal as cash advance the amount of P1 million from the CIF appropriated under the Office of the City Mayor for the fiscal year 2001 “to address the peace and order situation of Dapitan City Ex-Dapitan mayor gets 6-year imprisonment for pocketing intelligence funds. In convicting Ruiz, the Sandiganbayan stated that the timing of the P1-million cash advance was suspect as it was done on May 16, 2001, or five days after the May 11, 2001, elections, where he lost his bid for reelection.

 

Still more advances

Accused Ruiz’s failure to satisfactorily explain where the money went is sufficient to conclude that he converted the same for his personal use,” the ruling said (Cynthia D. Balana, Ex-Dapitan mayor gets 6-year imprisonment for pocketing intelligence funds, Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 23, 2013.)”

These convictions or findings are but a drop in the bucket of money pilfered, in spite of the rules governing the use of intelligence funds outlined in Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Memorandum Circular No. 99-65 dated April 23, 1999.

Unquestionably, Confidential and Intelligence Expenses should exclude expenses for political purposes, irrespective of the Chief Local Executives’ wide latitude of discretion as to their use.  There are rules to be followed otherwise it would amount to criminal malversation or technical malversation.

Among others, its use is exclusive to “(1) the purchase of information; (2) payment of rewards; (3) rental and other incidental expenses relative to the maintenance of safe houses; and (4) purchase of supplies and ammunitions, provision of medical and food aid, as well as payment of incentives or traveling expenses relative to the conduct of intelligence or confidential operations (paragraph 3, II, DILG Memorandum Circular No. 99-65 dated April 23, 1999,” which Provincial Governors, City Mayors, and Municipal Mayors are authorized to use public funds for said purposes.

 

The ammunition and other supplies enumerated under item (4) is actually duplicity as these can be purchased from the regular funds of the LGU, or the medical and food aid from the calamity fund in case of a state of calamity.

Unless perhaps the LGU is building an armory, then it may purchase ammunitions both from the regular fund and from the intelligence fund.

The minimum allowable ceiling to use funds for intelligence or confidential purposes shall not exceed thirty percent (30%) of the total annual amount allocated for peace and order efforts or, three percent (3%) of the total annual appropriations, whichever is lower.

 

Therefore, for a middle-class LGU with an assumed annual budget of Php 40,000,000.00, the 3% Intelligence Fund allocation could go as high as 1.2 million pesos, which to an Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) dependent third-class municipality is substantial to finance more priority expenses rather than just being pocketed.

 

Section 16 under the General Welfare Clause is one of the flaws of the Local Government Code. It is redundant and overlaps with the non-devolved specialized functions of other government agencies.

 

What needs an LGU of intelligence operations when it already has at its disposal the local Philippine National Police with its own Intelligence Division?  Foremost, there is the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), the primary intelligence gathering and analysis arm of the Philippine government, in charge of carrying out overt, covert, and clandestine intelligence programs.

 

There is also the National Bureau of Investigation, the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for drug-related cases, all of which agencies are more capable in intelligence operations.

 

The intelligence reports gathered by these specialized bodies are cascaded to LGUs through the Peace and Order Council, among others

 

Why should local chief executives personally deal on intelligence matters, instead of just allocating support funds for the local police?  And what kind of informations are necessary to be paid in millions of pesos?
 

It seems that the avarice and slothfulness of many LGUs has not ended. 

 

“Officers of the Philippine Councilors League have expressed support for the bills seeking to increase the internal revenue allotment (IRA) shares of local government units.

 

‘Alan D. Zulueta, PCL chairman and Tagum City (Davao del Norte) councilor, said the national government should get only 40% share of Internal Revenue and LGUs should be the one to get 60% because of the functions devolved to it it. He said that local governments should be given more funds to address poverty and local peace and order problems (Adrian P. Nemes III, Posted on Business World Online, August 12, 2013.)”

 

The increased budget allocation for local peace and order would mean a higher Intelligence Fund, and LGUs will tend to rely on IRA rather than tap their own revenue sources.

 

From another perspective, at the onset of the Local Government Code cities mushroomed as municipalities frenzied for cityhood.  This was what occurred in the case of the “16 Cities” that have taken the Congressional backdoor and became cities by the benefit of the Supreme Court’s flip-flopping and contempt of the Rules of Court. 

A mad scramble for cityhood  for the sole purpose of augmenting their share of the IRA.  Internal Revenue Allotment that has not been properly channeled for development, but spent more for Personal Services (PS) and consequently for Confidential and Intelligence Expenses.

 

Contrary opinions may assert that there is simply no proof to convince a reasonable mind as to the fund’s misuse.

 

In a small remote town down south, Intelligence Fund is divided per quarter of the year among the Local Chief Executive, Vice Mayor, and the incumbent Sangguniang Bayan Members as if it is their own personal fund or additional compensation.

 

Disbursements are made through a “vale system” from the Municipal Treasurer, the same way that daily wage laborers make cash advances by the use of a piece of paper written on it the amount as charged to “I.F.” for a certain quarter, and signed by the municipal official concerned.

 

Unashamed thievery of public funds, undignified for men wanting to be addressed as “Honorables”.

 

Money chargeable to their I.F. share was collected from the Municipal Treasurer as if withdrawing from their personal piggy bank.

 

An employee who was nauseated by this feasting on public funds has initiated charges before the Office of the Ombudsman.  She was however demeaned by the respondents through counsel that the “complainant, a mere Messenger I assigned at the Accounting Office, would question the manner by which the Intelligence Fund of the Municipal Mayor will be spent”.  It was very disturbing and shocks moral sensibilities.     It is but another way of saying that by virtue of their public position and rank the respondents are above the law and not accountable to the people.

 

The “mere messenger”, as the demeaning reference made to the complainant by the distinguished and honorable respondents, is also a citizen and a taxpayer who takes an active interest in the management of the affairs and funds of the government, and to whom the respondents in their official capacities are accountable to. 

 

The argument mirrors an abusive behavior and personality of the respondents and counsel that well exemplifies neo-colonial and neo-feudal arrogance that erodes public trust in the government and fans the flame of insurgency. 

 

Unfortunately, the Office of the Ombudsman in gist has favored the respondents and subscribed to their arguments that “there should first be a finding of the COA before charges could proceed.”

 

Primarily, how can there be COA findings when resident auditors are precluded by statutes to scrutinize disbursements of the Intelligence Fund?

 

But sans COA findings the Office of the Ombudsman has failed to see at least the irregularity in the disbursement of funds through a “vale system”, in violation of Section 338 of the Local Government Code which governs fiscal disbursements in local government units.

 

“CHAPTER 4, - Expenditures, Disbursements, Accounting, and Accountability

 

 ‘SECTION 338.  Prohibitions Against Advance Payments. – No money shall be paid on account of any contract under which no services have been rendered or goods delivered.

 

SECTION 339. Cash Advances. – No cash advance shall be granted to any local official or employee, elective or appointive, unless made in accordance with the rules and regulations as the Commission on Audit may prescribe. (Section 338 & Section 339, Chapter IV, Book II, Republic Act 7160)”

 

Why did the Mayor allowed it? It was a blackmail in disguise.  The Legislative approved the budget and the Local Chief Executive was held hostage.

 

But nonetheless, “Facinus quos inquinal aequal” – villany and guilt make all those whom it contaminates equal in character.

 

Together with the pork barrel the intelligence expenses must be scrapped as there is already the Peace and Order Initiatives in existence which are audited in the standard manner that requires a more detailed and rigorous justifications.

 

The Commission on Audit must also review and identify the loopholes in the present system of Confidential and Intelligence Expenses audit, and rework for a more stringent accountability measures.

 

Another favorite source of “petty corruption” is the use of the mandatory 20% development fund of LGUs.    From the development fund expenses for junkets under the pretext of “lakbay-aral (educational tours)” or “benchmarking” may be sourced.

 

What is in Hongkong or Beijing that may be learned and adopted as a development tool or strategy in a backward agricultural municipality?  Neither is it necessary for a purely internal meeting of an LGU to be held in Boracay at the sole expense of the government.  What a waste of money.  National government agencies can’t simply do that, and if ever, it’s because the convention is inter-agency, sponsored, and/or with participants from all over the country.

 

It was a respite though that in the incumbency of the late Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Jesse M. Robredo and Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Secretary Florencio B. Abad a Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2011-1 dated April 13, 2011 was issued amending the guidelines on the appropriation and utilization of the 20% of the annual internal revenue allotment for development projects, “to enhance transparency and accountability of local government units in undertaking development projects”.

 

The use of the 20% development fund was confined to Social Development, Economic Development, and Environmental Management and it specifically excluded

 

1.     Administrative expenses such as cash gift, bonuses, food allowance, medical assistance, uniforms, supplies, meetings, communication, water and light, petroleum products and the like;

2.     Salaries, wages or overtime pay;

3.      Travelling expenses, whether domestic and foreign;

4.      Registration or participation fees in training, seminars, conferences or conventions;

5.      Construction, repair or refinishing of administrative offices;

6.      Purchase of administrative office’ furniture, fixtures, equipment or appliances;  and

7.      Purchase, maintenance or repair of motor vehicles or motor cycles.

 

Has junkets stopped, or it simply assumed new disguises?  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



DEBUREAUCRATIZED GOVERNANCE

The issue on the misuse of the Pork Barrel or the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) through bogus Non-Government Organizations had been anticipated decades ago.  Only that it was not expected that the stolen money could amount into billions of pesos.

This blog attempts to link yesterday’s perceptions with the reality of today, and to trace the metamorphosis of Non-Government Organizations and the public- private sector cooperation in governance.

Governance styles and concepts changes with the times to keep abreast with the present requirements of the governed, and even to satisfy the ends of the ruling authority.  These changes come in various forms and nomenclature as in “reorganization”, “re-inventing”, “re-engineering”, “pole-vaulting to the next millennium”, “a shot in the arm”.  Or simply the bureaucracy is trimmed as in the Rationalization Plan mandated by Executive Order 366.

Not in a few cases do these re-engineerings are conceived merely to lend a semblance of a working bureaucracy, which policy directions are but in reality just a rehash of the same processes.

 

These re-inventions and policy directions of the bureaucracy come with catchphrases  like “Matatag na Republika”, Perlas ng Silangan” and currently P-Noy’s “Daang Matuwid”.

Governance leans towards privatization and government- private cooperation institutionalized under the Local Government Code of 1991, the “Build-Operate-Transfer” (BOT) or “Build- Own-Operate-Transfer” (BOOT) schemes on project implementation and management.

 

In the same manner, Non-Government Organizations have mushroomed, faded into oblivion, or have bloated into notoriety as in the bogus NGOs through which public funds were funneled into private accounts.

 

Debureaucratization, or the transfer of  responsibility, from the national or local level, of  the public functions usually delivered by government institutions to the private sector is the primary purpose of public governance under R.A. 7160.    It aims to change the delivery of services from being impersonal to that of  a “dynamic and flexible services controlled by the user rather than by top-down planners” as elicited by grater public participation.  

The era of de-bureaucratized governance has fathered the birth of many NGOs.

NGOs or People’s Organizations are to some extent assume the bureaucratic responsibilities as theoretically they are the “creation of the civil society that stands as a counter balance to the state and ensures that people are given the primary responsibility in determining  their lives (Local Development Assistance Program, “Building the Foundations for People’s Governance, cited by Tomas A. Sajo, NGO/PO Participation in Local Governance)” these organizations  provide a venue wherein the citizenry may directly participate in the management of  governmental affairs directly affecting them.

 

NGOs proliferated shortly after the enactment of Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 that Legazpi City, with fifty-nine (59) accredited NGOs,  has the highest number outside of Metro Manila.

 

This number as of July 1998 dwindled to fifteen (15), with five (5) pending new applications, which raises the conclusion that these

NGOs/ People’s Organizations were fund driven.   Obviously, NGOs mushroomed overnight more in the context of personal gain or benefit for its members and organizers.    NGOs and People’s Organizations organizers were evidently more concerned with possible fundings rather than community service.   Others may have just used the accreditation papers to secure foreign grants for their exclusive agenda.

What had been lacking perhaps in NGO partnership that scams ran out of proportion was an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism can be achieved through GO-NGO/PO partnership.   It is the system of checks and balances which need no further elaboration.   The only concern is the possibility of a collusion between the LGU and NGO/PO to which the citizenry should be vigilant of.

 

After about seven years when NGO’s existence proliferated or came into the limelight secondary to the adoption of the Local Government Code of 1991, non-government organizations should at this time have acquired vast experiences to be mature enough to be less dependent or motivated by monetary backing.    

The problem with most NGOs is that project implementation or any  socio-economic development endeavor is always equated with fundings, aggravated by the ‘solitary existence syndrome’.   It is a common pitfall for NGOs to conceive  a project on the context of the confines of the NGOs organizational set up and resources.   Most NGOs fail to recognize the vast potentials of  cooperation between other NGOs and the government, and instead driven into competitiveness which at times proves fatal for being thrown off course from the development agenda, and succumbs to mutual destruction by popularity, mistrust by client-beneficiary, and organizational weakness created by intrigues.  

The Filipino trait of “amor propio” or pride is negatively carried over to the NGO’s organizational directions that one may rather operates on its own un-mindful of similar organizations.  It is rare to see an NGO publicly admitting its limitations by forming an alliance with other NGOs to achieve a common purpose.   

Cooperation by and among all sectors of society and local government units for self-reliance is the very essence of the Local Government Code.   This is the main consideration that many NGOs have failed to take into account that instead NGOs were instead transformed into political dummies.    The services of an NGO may be limited to the utilization of its human resources, and may cooperate with other well funded NGOs engaged in similar projects.

 

In a paper, “Two Decades of Bicol NGOs”, written thirteen years ago attention is called on the end note which predicted the creation of dummy NGOs as what was discovered now.

 

The “One Million People March” protesting the large scale graft through bogus NGOs may not have reached the projected number.  But the message has been clear.

 

One of the lessons to be learned  from history is for leaders to listen and heed the  people’s voice.   EDSA I and EDSA II also started as a “picnic” and the consequences were never expected.

 

“Vox populi, vox dei”

 

TWO DECADES OF BICOL NGO’S

----   JAIME E. MASAGCA,  PM 251

 

 

A   RETROSPECT

 

 

During the first quarter storm and onwards, while student activism was common, non-government organizations were unheard of in the City of Legazpi.   Cooperativism was new and whatever voluntary organizations existing at that time were but mere social, civic, or religious associations organized for their own agenda and not in the context for which the modern day NGO’s were organized.

 

The dominant voluntary organizations working hand in hand with the Marcos martial law government belongs to the minority and confined to the favored few.   Its membership were mostly of the unthinking elite, the likes of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways Blue Ladies Circle, and the Green Revolution Movement who but served as the dictator’s cheering squad.   The existence of groups of this kind props up the legitimacy of the dictatorship with a guise of an active democracy.

 

The formation of these government sponsored organizations during the Marcos era, including the so called youth participation in the democratic processes through the Kabataang Barangay were organized merely to quell unrest specially among the youth.   Subsequent events validate the criticisms that the KB was conceived as a training ground for the Marcos siblings groomed to perpetuate a political dynasty.

 

In the countryside, membership to the Coconut Farmers Federation (COCOFED) and the “Samahang Nayon” was encouraged and non membership to these government inspired organizations were considered as  taboo, to some extent non-members were suspected as rebels.   This unmistakably reveals its ultimate purpose in the counter-insurgency tactics which is to control and monitor individual activities in the grassroots level.    Other group activities not sanctioned by the government were considered as “illegal assemblies,” or one may be accused of “rumor mongering.”

 

On the last years of Martial Law in the Bicol Region, non-government organizations representing different sectors of society have proliferated, with many of them metamorphosing from simple third sector organizations concerned  with basic activities such as backyard gardening, animal dispersals, community resource management, and organizational development.  

 

This evolution was the result of the intensification of  advocacy works “to create greater public awareness  to mobilize civil society for collective protest actions  (    Luis P. Eleazar,  Dimensions, Patterns and Limits of Interdependence: An Assessment of Government -Third Sector Relations in Environmental Management).”

 

They came to be  known as cause oriented groups; and rather than viewed as conduits for development or as a potential tool  through which  government basic services may be delivered, were frowned upon by the government and branded by the military as “leftist groups” or “infiltrated by subversive elements.”          

In these phases of martial rule the line that divides the cause oriented groups from the “legitimate organizations”, or the forerunners of the present day NGO’s, is its  subservience to government policies or its being critical to the administration.  With such tests, the Basic Christian Community,  the Bicol Medical Action Group,  the Bicol Coconut Planters Association, Inc., the Daraga-Legazpi Jeepney Drivers & Operators Association, Inc., the Urban Poor Federation, the Alliance of Concerned Teachers, and other similar people’s organizations in Bicol were regarded as leftist or subversive infiltrated groups and were under constant watch by the military.   

 

POST  EDSA

 

The growing number of people’s organizations in the pre-EDSA era was a gross indication of people’s discontent in the administration’s failure or inadequacies to deliver basic services, which fueled people’s unrest that culminated at EDSA on February 1986.  The late Lean Alejandro, former Bagong Alyansang Makabayan Secretary General, had said that the wave that crashed at EDSA was not an overnight effort but the result of  the years of militancy and consistent advocacy for public awareness by cause oriented groups.   

 

The post-EDSA Revolution era, particularly during the Ramos Administration, had ushered in the mushrooming of NGO’s as it is known today while the cause oriented groups had been reduced in number and ceased to share the political limelight.   Not a few from the cause oriented groups had “changed strategy” in advancing their cause.   From being street parliamentarians  they seek elective posts while others joined the bureaucracy in the hope of  serving as catalysts for change.   

 

Many organizations, mostly  falsely claiming to have been anti-Marcos, came into existence to advance the political and economic interests of the ambitious while others were motivated by government fundings and foreign assistance.  The incidence of fund anomalies as publicly reported and known NGO and civic organization leaders or members seeking public elective offices supports this theory.  

 

History streams by and has brought political and socio-economic changes but has left some non-government organizations the same.   These are those elitist organizations whose  concepts of community service does not go beyond an annual medical and dental mission in some rural or depresses areas. or  the building of waiting sheds with the name of their group emblazoned in gold. 

 

As one, who is now elected as Municipal Mayor, then laments : “The trouble with these organizations is that a middle class applying for membership is regarded as a ‘social climber’.”

 

At this point, one may be tempted to conclude that following Emerson’s theory of reciprocal power-dependence relations,  the distinction between a cause oriented group and  a non-government organization as contemplated in contemporary definitions is directly proportional to power dependence ratio.    Simply stated, cause oriented organizations have a low level of  inter-dependence with the government while NGOs induced by the implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991 have a high level of inter-dependence with the government. 

 

 

 LGU - PRIVATE SECTOR  COOPERATION

 

In the paper of  Perla E. Legaspi and Eden V. Santiago (ASPAP Collaborative Research; The State of the Devolution Process:  The Implementation of the 1991 Local Government Code in Selected LGU’s)  summarizing the case studies on the issues and concerns of the devolution process in its first years, Legazpi City with 54 accredited NGOs  has been ranked as the city outside of Metro Manila with the highest number  of  organizations.

 

Inspite of this high number of accredited organizations,  they are still in the stage of infancy and hence unable to adequately respond or assume whatever significant duties and responsibilities delegated to it.   At present,  the NGO’s accredited by the City of Legazpi confines its activities to cooperativism, capability building, livelihood projects, sectoral financial assistance, and serves as consultative bodies on current vital issues (Source :  Planning and Development Office, City of Legazpi;  Mr. Norberto G. Meneses, City Government Assistant Development Head  I;   Mr. Roleo Battung,  City Administrator).

  

Except for NGOs like the Simon of Cyrene  that had been long existing for their own agenda and does not concern so much in LGU collaborations,  local post R.A. 7160 NGOs are still to be weaned from the basic orientations to be able to take the challenges coupled with responsibilities that an LGU may delegate or the responsibilities of serious multi-sectoral collaboration.

 

Perhaps the only “capable” Non-Government Organization that had been tapped by both the Albay Provincial and Legazpi City governments is the Albay-Legazpi Emergency Rescue Team (ALERT).   The LGUs coordinate with this group in undertaking emergency rescue and disaster management.   ALERT, which has shown a “high level of volunteerism” during many disaster like the 1993 eruptions of Mayon Volcano,  is composed of volunteer members from the Philippine National Red Cross, the PNP, the  Bureau of Fire Protection, the local media, and from a number of amateur radio groups.   It has signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the governments of the City of Legazpi and Albay Province on disaster preparedness, trainings,  and rescue operations. 

 

With the “unpreparedness”  of local non-profit NGOs, the City of Legazpi has opted to tap the private profit-oriented entities to make more efficient the delivery of some public services at the least costs to the government.  

 

Legazpi’s pilot project was the Satellite Market and Integrated Bus Terminal  built on a four hectare government property.    The project costing  about 70 million pesos was loaned with the LGU putting up a counterpart of  more than 40 million pesos.  

 

Through a public bidding, the operation of the complex was awarded to Ibalong Management Services, Inc. at its bid of  2.8 million pesos per annum, inclusive of insurance premiums, for a 25 year lease.

 

The LGUs participation in the operation of the market is limited to the provision of support services for the general development of the complex.    New jitney and tricycle routes  were introduced, and  street lighting was improved.    An extension office of the City Administrator is however maintained at the complex to serve as a public assistance center.

 

The advantages of this arrangement are that maintenance is better, and fixed income for the LGU is assured without additional costs as the latter is spared from the cost of  maintenance & operating expenses and hiring of additional personnel.   The only setback noted was the consequent higher rental rates of stalls compared to the socialized rates in government owned and operated  markets.      

 

 A second project (under construction) called the City Mall and costing 300 million pesos is leased for twenty five years to Liberty Commercial Center, Inc. for 8 million pesos per annum.     This is followed by the scheduled public bidding for the 25 year lease of the Ibalong Centrum for Recreation for a minimum of  5 million pesos per annum.

 

From the above endeavors, the trend of the city government is towards privatization of public services and concentrate itself to the affairs of local governance.    Perhaps the thrusts of LGUs in the “debureaucratization” process should also be anchored on the balance of social needs and  government aims, which if the “debureaucratization” will be delegated to a large extent to the private profit oriented groups the balance would tilt more on one side and defeat the very purpose for which the government was created.  

 

In the Legazpi City Satellite Market and Integrated Bus Terminal experience,  market vendors and other tenants of the complex are left at the mercy  of the grantee of the lease contract.    An NGO, much better a Big Non-Government  Organization (BINGO), will operate differently which will redound to the public’s benefits.   For one, the high rental rates asked from the tenants by Ibalong Management Services, Inc. is  expected from a  corporation whose aim is a high return of investments.   In contrast, a non-profit/non-stock corporation such as an NGO will not be primarily concerned with profit and will strive only to break even with expenses.    

 

 

 

END  NOTES

  

The Local Government Code of 1991 encourages the existence and LGU-NGO collaborations and makes them “ active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy   (Article 62, Rule XIII,  Implementing Rules, Republic Act 7160).”  which shall be directly involved, among others, in the planning,  project implementation on issues concerning the delivery of basic services and facilities.

 

The issue that concerns the public will be then the credibility of NGOs.  The main consideration is their nature of being non-profit and non-stock corporations which runs counter to normal human behavior.   The assumption that NGOs were organized primarily for service and not for profit cannot in reality be totally admitted.   What are the safeguards in LGU-NGO collaborations particularly if it involves government fundings,  when the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code does not provide for a system of checks and balances and loopholes may be encountered in a project’s memoranda of agreement.

 

If graft and corruption is a major concern in a bureaucracy provided with safeguards through an independent and internal audit and a legal system for the prosecution of offenders, what more in a non-government entity.

 

LGU-NGO collaboration may be subject to all kinds of abuse and there is no uniform and a particular law enacted to safeguard the interests of the government.  To illustrate, if this writer is a Congressman or a Senator,  he could create a dummy Non-Government Organization to be the “exclusive” receiver, beneficiary, or implementor of the latter’s  CDF funded projects.  In effect, this NGO will be nothing but a personal net created at the other end of the bureaucracy to catch and haul profits for the distinguished member of the Philippine Congress.

 

From published reports and interviews with local beneficiaries of  foreign assisted programs like the “Lingap Pangkabataan”, “Bagong Paglaom”, or the “Foster Parents Program”, the experiences from these church based NGOs were not also very encouraging.